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The key feature of the modern U.S. personal bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a
￿nancial fresh start through debt discharge. The primary justi￿cation for the discharge
policy is to preserve human capital by maintaining incentives for work. In this paper, we test
this fresh start argument by providing the ￿rst estimate of the e⁄ect of personal bankruptcy
￿ling on the labor supply using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Our
econometric approach controls for the endogenous self-selection of bankruptcy ￿ling and
allows for dependence over time for the same household. We ￿nd that ￿ling for bankruptcy
does not have a positive impact on annual hours worked by bankrupt households, a result
mainly due to the wealth e⁄ects of debt discharge. The ￿nding is robust to a number of
alternative model speci￿cations and sample selections. Therefore, our analysis does not ￿nd
supporting evidence for the human capital argument for bankruptcy discharge.
JEL Classi￿cations: J22, K35, D14Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
￿William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act I, scene 3
1 Introduction
The key feature of modern U.S. law on personal bankruptcy is debt forgiveness. A debtor who
￿les for bankruptcy can obtain a discharge from most of his existing debts after surrendering
either some of his current assets or a portion of his future earnings.1 Since discharge not only
releases the debtor from past ￿nancial obligations but also protects him from some of the
adverse consequences that may otherwise result from that release,2 it is viewed as granting
the debtor a ￿nancial fresh start.
The primary goal of the fresh start policy is to preserve human capital by providing
incentives to work.3 As the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in its in￿ uential ruling in Lo-
cal Loan Co. v. Hunt (1934), bankruptcy discharge ￿gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor...a new opportunity in life and a clear ￿eld for future e⁄ort, unhampered by the pres-
sure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.￿Without debt discharge, ￿from the viewpoint
of the wage-earner there is little di⁄erence between not earning at all and earning wholly
for a creditor.￿That is, as an insolvent debtor devotes more of his energies and resources to
leisure and other activities that frustrate creditors￿collection e⁄orts, he not only decreases
his productive contributions to society but also generates deadweight loss.
The belief that bankruptcy discharge fosters greater industriousness has long been held in
the United States. In 1755, nearly two centuries before the ruling in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt
and almost a half-century before the enactment of the ￿rst federal bankruptcy law in 1800, an
anonymous author wrote in the ￿rst published argument for outright bankruptcy discharge
1The debt discharge is at the cost of current assets if the debtor ￿les under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy
law, and of future earnings if he ￿les under Chapter 13. Bankruptcy discharge is a nonwaivable right that
can be denied only if a debtor has violated some norm of behavior (e.g., fraud) speci￿ed by the law. Certain
debts, such as child support, however, are not dischargeable. See U.S.C. Title 11￿ Bankruptcy, Sec. 727.
2Credit bureaus may keep and disseminate bankruptcy records for only 10 years.
3There are other justi￿cations for the debt discharge. For example, discharge allows risk sharing because
creditors are thought to be better risk bearers than debtors. Discharge may also be a better policy than
other safety-net programs in dealing with household insolvency because it shifts the task of monitoring to
creditors, who are more e¢ cient than the general public in screening and monitoring borrowers. Thus, it
alleviates the moral hazard problem commonly associated with other social welfare programs that debtors
might rely on if there were no debt discharge (Jackson 1998). See also Hirsch (1994), who wrote that ￿the
idea of the fresh start can be probed from half a hundred di⁄erent pedagogical angles" (page 202).
1that if the debtor can ￿begin the world anew, he might be encouraged to frugality and
industry.￿(Anonymous 1755) Surprisingly, despite the prominence of this belief, no formal
economic study has examined this issue. In this paper, we seek to bridge the gap in the
literature and to provide the ￿rst estimate of the e⁄ect of ￿ling for personal bankruptcy on
the labor supply. This study is important because it sheds light on the e¢ ciency consequences
of the current bankruptcy system and indicates the extent of bias in those welfare studies of
bankruptcy that do not account for bankruptcy-induced changes in the labor supply.
Using a simple static model, we ￿rst highlight forces that work either for or against
the fresh start logic. First, positive wealth e⁄ects are associated with personal bankruptcy
￿ling. Under the current bankruptcy provisions, all unsecured debt owed by the bankrupt
is discharged, but only some assets are seized. As long as the value of the seized assets does
not exceed that of the discharged debt, debtors will be richer upon ￿ling for bankruptcy.
This positive wealth e⁄ect implies that debtors will work less hard in bankruptcy than
they would if they had to repay all debt. Second, a debtor can simply default on his debt
without ￿ling for bankruptcy, in which case creditors￿collection practice is governed by state
insolvency laws. Since insolvency laws do not have provisions for debt discharge, creditors
can grab any of the debtor￿ s assets￿ both current and future￿ outside some limited exemptions
until, in principle, all debt is paid. Some states also allow creditors to collect through wage
garnishment. These collection e⁄orts can establish an e⁄ective tax levy on earnings, which
provides negative incentives for work and positive incentives for ￿tax evasion.￿Filing for
bankruptcy may reduce these disincentives for work and, as a result, induce higher labor
supply to the marketplace. As the net e⁄ects of the above two forces are ambiguous, they
must be measured empirically.
Using the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimate the e⁄ect
of bankruptcy ￿ling on households￿annual hours worked. In our analysis, we control for
the endogenous selectivity of bankruptcy ￿ling. We also allow for dependence over time
for the same household to control for unobserved and household-speci￿c heterogeneity. We
￿nd that bankruptcy ￿ling does not have a positive impact on households￿annual hours
worked. To the contrary, consistent with our theory, all the corresponding coe¢ cients from
our estimation equations have negative signs, although these coe¢ cients are not statistically
signi￿cant at the usual levels. These ￿ndings are robust to a number of alternative sample
selections and model speci￿cations.
Our results suggest that current personal bankruptcy provisions do not provide any
positive work incentives. Therefore, we should not take for granted the validity of the
fresh start argument when evaluating the welfare consequences of the personal bankruptcy
2law or when proposing new changes.4 That said, our analysis does not rule out the role
of the personal bankruptcy law as a social insurance program. Indeed, using data on food
consumption provided by the PSID, we ￿nd that bankrupt households consumed more under
bankruptcy ￿ling than they would have if they had not ￿led. The estimate, however, is
statistically insigni￿cant.
This paper addresses three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the many studies
that examine the factors leading to personal bankruptcy, and it responds to the growing
interests in the impact of personal bankruptcy on consumer behavior. Among these studies,
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) show that medical and credit-card debt is an important factor
in households￿decision to ￿le for bankruptcy and in their selection of the chapter under which
they ￿le. Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) ￿nd that ￿nancial bene￿ts and social stigma also
play important roles in households￿bankruptcy ￿ling decision. Buckley and Brinig (1998)
and Gross and Souleles (2002) ￿nd that in recent years, declining social stigma is consistent
with an increasing propensity to ￿le for bankruptcy. Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) and
Lin and White (2001) study how bankruptcy laws a⁄ect the supply of and demand for credit.
They show that generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions increase the amount of credit
held by high-asset households and reduce the availability and amount of credit extended
to low-asset households. Although Elul and Subramanian (2002) ￿nd that di⁄erences in
bankruptcy laws motivate households to ￿forum shop,￿or move to a state with a higher
exemption before declaring bankruptcy, these authors note that the actual e⁄ect is relatively
modest. Repetto (1998) shows that the protection of assets by bankruptcy discourages
saving. Finally, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) provide a detailed description of
the ￿nancial circumstances of those who ￿le for bankruptcy. Although our focus￿ the e⁄ects of
personal bankruptcy on the labor supply￿ has been at the center of legislation on bankruptcy
issues, it has been largely ignored in this literature.
Second, this paper also contributes to the larger literature on the e⁄ects of social insurance
programs and laws on the labor supply. Previous works have extensively examined the
various wealth and substitution e⁄ects caused by social institutions, a tradition that our
paper follows here. For example, Mo¢ tt (2002) reviews the literature on how one popular
social insurance program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), has a⁄ected
the labor supply. Existing studies found almost universally that the program reduced the
labor supply by 10 percent to 50 percent of non-AFDC levels. See also Krueger and Meyer
(2002) for a comprehensive review of the recent literature on other programs,
Finally, this paper ￿lls in a gap left by the growing number of studies that use equilibrium
4See, for example, Mester (2002) for a discussion on the components of recent bankruptcy reform pro-
posals.
3approaches to characterize the quantitative features of an economy in which agents have the
option to default. These studies evaluate the e⁄ects of changes in bankruptcy laws on the
welfare of the economy. Recent works of this kind include Athreya (2002); Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2002); Li and Sarte (2003); and Livshits, MacGee and
Tertilt (2001). All of these papers emphasize the risk-sharing aspect of the bankruptcy law,
and either leave out the labor market completely or model it in a minimal way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of bankruptcy
and labor supply. Section 3 then discusses the empirical methodology, the data, and the
empirical results. Section 4 reports the results from additional tests of robustness. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we outline a simple static model to characterize personal bankruptcy and
labor supply decisions. Our main purpose here is to highlight the di⁄erent forces that work
for or against the ￿fresh start￿argument and to guide our empirical analysis.
Agents in our model live for one period. They value both consumption and leisure, and
they make decisions to maximize their period utility U(c;1 ￿ l), where c (c > 0) denotes
consumption, and l (0 ￿ l ￿ 1) denotes labor supply with time endowment normalized to 1.
The utility function exhibits the usual properties of monotonicity and concavity and satis￿es
the Inada conditions with respect to both inputs. We further assume that consumption and
leisure are substitutable.
Consider an individual who has the right of ￿ling for bankruptcy. He begins the period
with assets a and debt d, where d includes the principal plus the interest. After he receives
his wage rate w, he decides how much labor, l, to supply and whether to ￿le for bankruptcy.
If he ￿les for bankruptcy,5 as noted earlier, he must surrender all of his assets exceeding
a predetermined exemption level. In exchange, all of his eligible debt is discharged. Let e
represent the level of asset exemption. Then
c = min(￿a;e) + wl: (1)
We assume 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 to allow the auction value of the assets turned over to the bankruptcy
trustee to be less than what they are worth to their owner and to capture bankruptcy ￿ling
5Data limitation precludes us from separating the e⁄ects of Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 in the empirical
analysis. We, therefore, focus solely on bankruptcy ￿ling under Chapter 7. In practice, over 70 percent of
personal bankruptcy ￿lings in the United States are under Chapter 7, and one-third of the Chapter 13 ￿lings
are later converted into Chapter 7.
4fees.6 This di⁄erence may be due to the cost of ￿re sale or to the extra sentimental value
that their owner attaches to the assets.
If he does not ￿le for bankruptcy, then
c = a + wl ￿ q(wl;d); (2)
where q(wl;d) = d when the borrower repays his debt, and q(wl;d) = ￿wl when the borrower
does not repay his debt and wage garnishment takes place. The wage garnishment rate, ￿, is
assumed to be weakly increasing in debt (d) and decreasing in wages (wl). For simpli￿cation,
we further assume that the borrower cannot conceal his assets or income from his creditors.7
As a result, when the debtor has the resources to repay the debt and does not ￿le for
bankruptcy, he will choose to repay the debt, because he cannot gain anything by simply
defaulting and having his wage garnished.
Finally, we assume that a debtor incurs certain costs, as modeled by a utility loss s > 0,
when ￿ling for bankruptcy. These costs can be pecuniary and nonpecuniary. First, under
the law, individuals who ￿le under Chapter 7 become ineligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
within six years. Since the option to ￿le for bankruptcy is valuable, forgoing it for the
next six years is costly. Second, a bankruptcy ￿ling remains on public record for 10 years.
With such a record on credit history, individuals are more likely to be excluded from credit
markets or have to borrow at higher rates (Musto 2002). Third, bankruptcy imparts a social
stigma (Buckley and Brinig 1998, Fay, Hurst, and White 2002, and Gross and Souleles 2002).
To illustrate our main points, we ￿rst assume that these losses occur independently of the
individual￿ s behavior except for the action of ￿ling for bankruptcy. This is obviously a strong
assumption. Later we discuss how the relaxation of this assumption, among other things,
a⁄ects our results. We will also argue that our empirical analysis requires that only some of
these losses￿ speci￿cally, social stigma￿ are independent of the labor supply decision.8
6Debtors must also pay fees for ￿ling bankruptcy and for legal services. Bankruptcy ￿ling fees are often
as low as $100 in large cities. The legal fees typically range from $750 to $1;500 (Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook 2000).
7One can assume that ￿ may also depend on the amount of time that the debtor spends in evading the
￿tax.￿ While interesting, it adds unnecessary complications to our analysis.
8There may also be a utility cost associated with having one￿ s wages garnished. Since we do not separately
model the decision of repaying the debt and having wages garnished, we normalize the cost to zero.
52.1 An Individual￿ s Problem




U(c;1 ￿ l) ￿ sI;
where I = 0 if the borrower does not ￿le for bankruptcy, and I = 1 otherwise.
Let V R and V B denote the individual￿ s maximum utility under the option of not ￿ling








U(min(￿a;e) + wl;1 ￿ l) ￿ s: (4)
We can think of an individual making decisions in two steps. He ￿rst computes the
optimal levels of consumption and labor and, hence, the utilities associated with not ￿ling
for bankruptcy and with ￿ling for bankruptcy. Then he selects the option that gives him
the highest utility. We now characterize the two-step decision rules.
2.2 The Labor Supply Decision
An individual chooses his optimal labor supply by solving the following ￿rst order conditions:9
w[1 ￿ q1(wl;d)]U1(a + wl ￿ q(wl;d);1 ￿ l) ￿ U2(a + wl ￿ q(wl;d);1 ￿ l) = 0 (5)
if he does not ￿le for bankruptcy; and
wU1(min(￿a;e) + wl;1 ￿ l) ￿ U2(min(￿a;e) + wl;1 ￿ l) = 0 (6)
if he ￿les for bankruptcy. Denote the labor supply decisions under the two options by lR,
and lB, respectively.
There are two possibilities in the non-bankruptcy state. In the ￿rst case, the debtor
repays his debt, i.e., q(wl;d) = d. Then, when the debtor loses more assets under debt
repayment than under bankruptcy, that is, a ￿ d ￿ min(￿a;e), bankruptcy ￿ling induces
a positive wealth shock. This wealth shock, in turn, lowers the debtor￿ s labor supply and
increases his consumption of leisure in bankruptcy.
In the second case, wage garnishment occurs, i.e., q(wl;d) = ￿(wl;d)wl. Then, when
a ￿ ￿wl ￿ min(￿a;e), the borrower would still incur a positive wealth shock by ￿ling for
9The Inada conditions ensure that households will choose both consumption and leisure in positive
amounts.
6bankruptcy, and the associated wealth e⁄ect will create a disincentive to work. However, the
wage garnishment now serves e⁄ectively as a wage tax. Thus, by substitution e⁄ect, it would
reduce the incentive to work in the nonbankruptcy state. Whether the debtor would work
less under bankruptcy ￿ling than under wage garnishment depends on whether the wealth
e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect.
Finally, although we do not explicitly consider Chapter 13 ￿ling, we can analyze it within
our framework. In essence, a Chapter 13 repayment plan works very much like the wage gar-
nishment but with partial debt discharge. As a result, the wealth e⁄ect and the substitution
e⁄ect would both discourage a debtor from exerting work e⁄ort under Chapter 13.
2.3 Bankruptcy Decision




0 if V R ￿ V B,
1 otherwise.
(7)
Because of the utility loss associated with ￿ling for bankruptcy, it is obvious that a debtor
would consider bankruptcy ￿ling only if a ￿ d ￿ min(￿a;e). It is easy to show that debtors
with more debt are more likely to ￿le for bankruptcy. This is because the value of ￿ling for
bankruptcy (V B) does not vary with the level of debt (d), while the value of not ￿ling for
bankruptcy decreases with debt under our assumption that the percent of wage garnished
(￿) increases with debt (d).
In terms of assets, it is clear that the utility associated with no bankruptcy ￿ling (V R)
increases with asset holdings (a)while the utility associated with bankruptcy ￿ling (V B)
initially increases with a until ￿a = e, and then it becomes invariant to the changes in the
assets. This suggests the existence of an asset threshold above which debtors will never
choose to ￿le for bankruptcy.
2.4 Summary
To sum up, a borrower￿ s propensity to ￿le for bankruptcy increases with his debt and de-
creases with his assets. Filing for bankruptcy induces a positive wealth e⁄ect, and this e⁄ect
will reduce the incentive to work. This implies that, without wage garnishment, a debtor
will work less hard under bankruptcy than when he does not ￿le for bankruptcy. With wage
garnishment, however, whether the debtor works less under bankruptcy depends on whether
the wealth e⁄ect induced by debt discharge dominates the substitution e⁄ect induced by
wage garnishment.
7Our results regarding both labor supply and bankruptcy decisions will obviously be damp-
ened if we relax several of the model￿ s key assumptions. For instance, in a dynamic setting,
because bankrupt households will have di¢ culty obtaining access to the credit market, they
may want to work harder and save more to insure against future adverse events. The above
simple framework nevertheless demonstrates that, contrary to the long-held fresh start view,
certain forces can induce less work e⁄ort under debt discharge.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Empirical Strategy
At each period, households make two decisions simultaneously: whether to ￿le for bankruptcy
and how much labor to supply. The bankruptcy decision is determined by the following
equation:
￿ = Y ￿ + "; (8)
such that I = 1 if ￿ > 0 and I = 0 otherwise. We denote a household￿ s desired labor supply
in the states of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy by lB and lR, respectively. We assume that
logl
R = X￿ + ￿
R; (9)
logl
B = Z￿ + ￿
B: (10)
Denote the observed labor supply in the data by l. Then
logl = (1 ￿ I)logl
R + I logl
B
= X￿ + I(Z￿ ￿ X￿) + ￿; (11)
where ￿ = ￿R+I(￿B ￿￿R). The vectors X, Y; and Z contain factors that a⁄ect households￿
labor supply and bankruptcy decisions, and ￿R, ￿B and " are error terms that may be
correlated with each other but are orthogonal to X, Y; and Z. In this paper we estimate
a restricted version of the above model by assuming that the conditional means of loglB
and loglR di⁄er only in the constant, that is, X = Z and ￿ = ￿ except that ￿0 6= ￿0. We
impose this restriction mainly because of data limitations discussed later. This practice is
also common in the program evaluation literature. Accordingly, equation (11) becomes
logl = X￿ + I^ ￿ + ￿; (12)
with ^ ￿ = ￿0 ￿ ￿0.
8As in the literature on program evaluation, the parameter that most interests the policy-
maker is the ￿treatment e⁄ect on the treated.￿ 10 In our case, the question becomes whether
and to what extent a bankrupt individual works harder than he would if he had not ￿led for
bankruptcy. In other words, the statistic we are interested in is
E(logl
B ￿ logl
RjX;Y;I = 1) = ^ ￿ + E(￿
B ￿ ￿
RjX;Y;I = 1): (13)
Bankruptcy decisions are endogenous and may be correlated with the error terms of the
labor supply equations. In this case, the explanatory variable I in equation (12) is not
orthogonal to ￿. As a result, a simple least squared regression of (12) will produce a biased
estimate of ^ ￿, which, in turn, leads to a biased estimate of (13).
In the program evaluation literature, two main approaches have often been used to solve
the above issue. The ￿rst approach is to explicitly characterize the selection bias just noted.













Taking expectation of our labor supply function (12) conditional on X;Y; and I, after some
rearrangements we have











where ￿ and ￿ are, respectively, the density and the cumulative distribution functions of a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. We call (1 ￿ I)
￿￿(Y ￿)
1￿￿(Y ￿) the inverse Mills￿
ratio for the repaid, and I
￿(Y ￿)
￿(Y ￿) the inverse Mills￿ratio for the bankrupt. Under the above
assumptions, the treatment e⁄ect on the treated, (13), is equal to
E(logl
B ￿ logl








evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables of the sample consisting of only bankrupted
households. We label this approach the contemporaneous selection control strategy. For
example, Ruhm (1997) and Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles (1998) have used this approach in
their research. We will use this strategy in our main analysis.
We implement the above strategy in two steps. First, we use a Probit regression to
estimate the household￿ s bankruptcy decision, from which we compute the two inverse Mills￿
10Another parameter often estimated is the e⁄ect of treatment on a randomly chosen person. It is the
coe¢ cient ^ ￿ in (12). See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) for detailed discussions on what parameters
matter most for the policymaker.
9ratios in (14). Then, we substitute the estimated inverse Mills￿ratios for their population
counterparts in (14) and use simple OLS regressions to estimate it. We obtain the standard
errors of all estimates through bootstrap methods; in drawing bootstrap samples, we allow
for dependence across observations over time for the same households.
Equation (14) implies that we can identify the model based on the nonlinearity of the
estimated inverse Mills￿ratios. However, a robust identi￿cation entails an instrumental vari-
able (IV) for the endogenous bankruptcy variable I. The IV should satisfy the requirements
that it a⁄ects the household￿ s bankruptcy decision but does not a⁄ect directly the desired
labor supply, except through its e⁄ect on the ￿ling propensity. A measure of social stigma
or attitude toward personal bankruptcy would meet such requirements. The problem is that
these personal preferences are not directly observable. However, previous authors, such as
Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Elul and Subramanian (2002), suggested that they may
depend on the number of people in the local areas who ￿led for bankruptcy in recent years.
The idea is that an individual may feel less stigma in ￿ling for bankruptcy if a lot of people
have also done so, a phenomenon often called ￿peer e⁄ect.￿The lagged state bankruptcy
￿ling rate, therefore, serves our purpose. We also include in our control variables lagged state
unemployment rate and lagged state income growth rate to control for the state economic
environment that presumably may also in￿ uence the lagged state bankruptcy ￿ling rate.
A second approach to solve the endogenous selection issue is an instrumental variable (IV)
approach, and it is well documented in Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999). Under this
approach, certain assumptions are made on the model structure such that the second term of
(13) equals zero. Two alternative assumptions are often invoked: E(￿B￿￿RjX;Y;I = 1) = 0,
or ￿B = ￿R (see Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999 for details). As a result, the treatment
e⁄ect on the treated is measured by ^ ￿ alone. To eliminate the covariance between I and ￿R,
we apply an IV method to equation (12), which allows us to obtain an unbiased estimate of
^ ￿. The IV should meet the same requirements as in the Contemporaneous Selection Control
strategy. Therefore, we also use the lagged state bankruptcy ￿ling rate as our IV. Later we
also present estimates based on this approach.
Again, we implement this instrumental variable approach in two steps. First, the same
Probit regression is run to estimate the household￿ s bankruptcy decision, from which we
compute the predicted probability of ￿ling for bankruptcy. Then, we replace I in equation
(12) with the predicted probability and use simple OLS regressions to estimate it. We
obtain the standard errors of all estimates through bootstrap methods; in drawing bootstrap
samples, we allow for dependence across observations over time for the same households.
103.2 Data
The data we use in this study are taken from the University of Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID).11 In 1996, the PSID asked respondents whether they had ever
￿led for bankruptcy and, if so, in what year(s). Our data set is a combined cross-section,
time-series sample of PSID households in the years 1984-1996. For households to be included
in the sample, they must have answered the PSID questionnaires in 1996. Moreover, if a
household ￿led for bankruptcy in year t, we drop the observations on that household in
later years.12 Our raw PSID sample comprises 66;810 observations with 7;941 families.
Observations were deleted for the following reasons:
￿ The head of household was under age 18 or over age 65 (7;942 observations).
￿ The head of household was retired, a student, in jail, or permanently disabled (3;370
observations).
￿ Hours worked by the head of household exceeded 5;096 hours a year or 14 hours a day
(84 observations).
￿ Total hours that the head of household spent working, unemployed, on strike, out of
the labor force, and nursing an illness (self or family members) exceeded 7;080 hours
a year or 20 hours a day (three observations).
￿ Information on the head of household￿ s age, education, marital status, number of
children, self-employment status, state of residence, hours worked, family income, em-
ployment status, and health status was missing (6;577 observations).
The ￿nal sample consisted of 48;834 observations on 6;837 households. The maximum
number of years over which we observe a household was 13; 50 percent of the households
were observed for six years or more.
Our sample contains 213 bankruptcy ￿lings, and the proportion of households that ￿led
for bankruptcy by year averaged 0:45 percent in the sample period, which is lower than
the national average of 0:7 percent over the same period. Our relatively low percentage
11The PSID is a longitudinal survey that has followed a nationally representative, random sample of families
and their extensions since 1968. The survey provides detailed economic and demographic information for
a sample of households. At ￿ve-year intervals from 1984 through 1999, a wealth supplement to the PSID
surveyed the assets and liabilities of each household.
12We do so because, as noted earlier, households that ￿le under Chapter 7 are barred from ￿ling again
under Chapter 7 for six years. Chapter 13 ￿lers are often not allowed to ￿le again within 180 days of the
previous ￿ling. Our regression results are virtually unchanged if we include the bankrupt households.
11may result from the underreporting of bankruptcy ￿lings by the households in our sample.
However, this underreporting did not signi￿cantly bias our estimates. As noted in Fay,
Hurst, and White (2002), as long as the number of households that actually went bankrupt
but lied about it in the survey is small relative to the number of households that actually did
not ￿le for bankruptcy, a condition that seems to hold in our sample, the underreporting of
bankruptcy ￿lings will lead to a minuscule bias in the estimates (see also Hausman, Abrevaya,
and Scott-Morton 1998).
We now discuss the constructions of the key variables used in our empirical analysis. First,
our theory suggests that unsecured debt and nonexempt assets at the time of the ￿ling are
two important ￿nancial variables a⁄ecting a household￿ s bankruptcy decision. Information
that is required to compute the two variables is from the following sources. The PSID
collected information on house equity every year; it also collected detailed wealth data in
1984, 1989, and 1994, including the amount of unsecured debt and the value of nonhousing
wealth. As proxies for the unsecured debt and other nonhousing wealth in the years not
covered by the wealth surveys, we use the data from the most recent wealth survey.
Our measure of unsecured debt takes into account the state laws on de￿ciency judgment.
De￿ciency judgment is a judgment against a borrower in favor of the lender in an amount
equal to the di⁄erence between the funds received from a court sale of property and the
balance remaining on a mortgage or other secured loan. Such judgments are not allowed
in some states. Thus, our unsecured debt variable equals the PSID reported unsecured
debt plus, for states that allow de￿ciency judgment, any negative home equity. We obtain
information on the state laws on de￿ciency judgment from Keyles (1995) and Jankowski
(1999).
To compute nonexempt assets, we also need to know bankruptcy exemptions. Table 1
reports our measures of exemptions by state for 1983 and 1992. Some states experienced
changes in either homestead or nonhomestead exemptions or both after 1992, and we report
these changes in Table 2. As we can see, both homestead and nonhomestead exemptions
vary widely across states, from under $100 to unlimited. In calculating these exemptions,
we use the 1983 values from Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) for the years 1984-1991, use
the 1992 values from White (1998) for 1992-1996 for the states that did not experience any
changes, and values from Lin and White (2001) for the states that have experienced changes
between 1993 and 1996. When state laws permit households to choose a federal exemption,
we use the federal exemption if it is higher than the state exemption. We also account for the
states that allow double exemptions for married households. In contrast, however, with the
practice of other researchers, such as Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Elul and Subramanian
(2002), we do not lump together homestead and nonhomestead exemptions. Our measure of
12nonexempt assets, therefore, equals nonhomestead assets minus nonhomestead exemptions
plus the part of the home equity that exceeds homestead exemption.
Another key variable is the sate garnishment laws, as it indicates the maximum rate of the
￿wage tax￿when an insolvent debtor simply defaults and allows his creditors to garnish his
wage. Most states either set no maximum wage garnishment level￿ in which case the federal
25 percent maximum applies￿ or set a percentage below the federal level. In particular, six
states outlaw wage garnishment altogether. Table 3 summarizes this information.
We use households￿reported annual work hours as our benchmark measure for labor
supply. Given that, in our ￿nal sample, there is no household with zero labor hours worked
for any given year, we use a logarithm of the hours in the estimation. We calculate the hourly
wage rate by dividing the reported earnings of the heads of households by their reported work
hours. We obtain the macroeconomic and other law variables from the following sources:
the state bankruptcy ￿ling rate, from the Administrative O¢ ce of the U.S. Courts; and the
growth rate of state household income and the state unemployment rate, from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
To choose other variables, we follow the suggestion of our theoretical model as well as
the traditions of the literature on bankruptcy decision and labor supply. Table 4 presents
descriptive statistics of key variables for the entire sample and for the bankruptcy subsample.
As shown, compared with the average household in the overall sample, the heads of bankrupt
households are younger, more likely to be female, less likely to own houses or businesses, less
likely to be married, but tend to have more kids; they are also more likely to have experienced
adverse events such as bad health, periods of unemployment, or divorce. In addition, they
worked similar hours but earned lower wage rates. Among the married households, the
wives of the bankrupt households tend to be younger, less educated and earned lower wage
rates than those of the overall sample. The other striking ￿nding is that bankruptcy ￿lers
have higher unsecured debt and lower nonexempt assets. Consequently, ￿nancial bene￿ts of
personal bankruptcy ￿ling￿ de￿ned as the di⁄erence of the wealth in ￿ling for bankruptcy and
in repaying debt￿ are signi￿cantly higher for the bankrupt households than for the average
household in the overall sample. This ￿nding indicates that ￿nancial gains may be an
important factor in households￿decision to ￿le for bankruptcy. Finally, bankrupt households
worked fewer combined hours by both the head and the wife and have lower family income
than the average household in the overall sample.13
13Family income in the PSID comprises the labor, asset, and transfer income of the husband, the wife,
and other family members.
133.3 Estimation Results
3.3.1 Bankruptcy Choice
We use a Probit regression to estimate households￿choice between bankruptcy and no bank-
ruptcy. Our theory dictated how we select the explanatory variables. We include information
on households￿wealth situation as characterized by nonexempt assets, unsecured debt, and
the interaction of the two terms; income information such as family income excluding head￿ s
wage, and minimum percentage of wage the head is allowed to keep under state garnishment
laws;14 and individual characteristics, such as age, education, race, martial status, number of
children, homeownership, business ownership; and information on adverse events that house-
holds experienced in the previous year including divorce, unemployment, and bad health. To
control for the aggregate economic environment, we include lagged rates of state unemploy-
ment, state income growth, and state bankruptcy ￿ling. We also include time and regional
dummies. Finally, to capture the nonlinear e⁄ects of some of the variables on bankruptcy
￿ling, we introduce the squared terms of unsecured debt, nonexempt assets, age, and family
income.
Table 5 shows the estimation results. We adjust the standard errors to allow for de-
pendence over time within (but not across) households when drawing bootstrap samples.
Overall, the results are consistent with our theory and with the empirical results obtained
by Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) and Elul and Subramanian (2002), both of whom also
use the PSID data. The sign of the lagged state bankruptcy ￿ling rate is positive, as pre-
dicted, and the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant at 95 percent con￿dence level. This
result supports our theory about the peer group, or stigma, e⁄ect. Financial variables are
also important factors in households￿bankruptcy decisions. Controlling for other things, we
￿nd that for the average household, a $1000 increase in unsecured debt raises the probability
of ￿ling for bankruptcy 0:014 percentage point, or 3 percent, given that the bankruptcy
￿ling rate for the average household as predicted in our model is 0:45 percentage point. A
$1000 increase in households￿nonexempt assets reduces the bankruptcy probability 0:001
percentage point, or 0:2 percent. This result indicates that at the margin, unsecured debt
plays a more signi￿cant role than do nonexempt assets in households￿bankruptcy decisions.
Among demographic variables, being married and having a large family increase the
probability of bankruptcy ￿ling. Previous experience of adverse events, including divorce
and unemployment, increases the probability of bankruptcy ￿ling. Living in a state with
harsh garnishment laws as measured by the maximum wage garnishment rate permitted by
each state also increases the bankruptcy probability, although not statistically signi￿cantly.
14The data do not provide any information on whether a debtor￿ s salary is indeed garnished.
14In contrast, having a good income prospect as measured by the head￿ s wage of the previous
year decreases the probability of bankruptcy. None of the macro variables has a notable e⁄ect
on the bankruptcy ￿ling of individual households after controlling for family characteristics,
time, and region. All other variables, such as age of head, homeownership, family income
excluding head￿ s wage income, and unemployment, have the expected signs, though their
coe¢ cients are not statistically signi￿cant.
3.3.2 The E⁄ect of Bankruptcy Filing on Annual Hours Worked by the Head
of a Household
We now turn to the e⁄ects of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply. We ￿rst present the
results estimated using the contemporaneous selection control strategy discussed above. We
measure the labor supply by the reported hours worked by the head of household in the same
year of the bankruptcy decision. As shown in (14), the explanatory variables include a bank-
ruptcy dummy I with I = 1 if the household ￿led bankruptcy and I = 0 otherwise. Lagged
hourly wage rate, as calculated by the ratio of reported labor market earnings to hours
worked, is included as one of the explanatory variables for the labor supply. Other explana-
tory variables include the two inverse Mills￿ratios constructed from the above bankruptcy
regression and demographic variables such as head￿ s age, age-squared, and educational at-
tainment. Note that the lagged state bankruptcy ￿ling rate is the IV for bankruptcy ￿ling,
and hence, it is not included in the labor supply regression.15
We report the regression coe¢ cients and their bootstrap standard errors in Table 6.
Note that the bootstrap samples are drawn by allowing dependence across years for the
same households. The e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply is computed according
to (15) and is shown at the bottom of the table.
As shown, the estimated e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply is ￿0:01, suggest-
ing that the head of the average bankrupt household reduces the annual labor supply about
1 percent, or working 20 fewer hours in bankruptcy, compared to the hours they would work
if they did not ￿le.16 The estimated coe¢ cient, however, is not statistically signi￿cant at the
usual con￿dence levels (90 or 95 percent). Therefore, our benchmark analysis shows that, if
anything, bankruptcy ￿ling seems to depress the labor supply of the heads of the bankrupt
households.
15Financial variables are not included either. However, our results are qualitatively robust to including
total assets and its square as additional explanatory variables in our labor supply regressions.
16To put our estimatein perspective, existing studies found almost universally that the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program reduced the labor supply by 10 to 50 percent of non-AFDC
levels. See Mo¢ tt (2002) for a literature review of the studies on the AFDC programs.
15Our results for other explanatory variables are consistent with those obtained in the
literature on the individual labor supply. Heads of household who are older, more educated,
and male work longer hours. Homeowners also work longer hours, while business owners
work fewer hours. Heads of household with higher family income in the previous year also
work more hours. This result suggests that past family income may be a good indicator of
future earning potential. After we controlled for family income, the head￿ s wage rate of the
previous year, however, a⁄ects labor supply negatively. Those heads who experienced health
problems or were unemployed in the previous year work signi￿cantly fewer hours. Finally,
heads of household who live in states with a high unemployment rate in the previous year
also supplied fewer labor hours, re￿ ecting the impact of reduced demand.
4 Robustness
Having presented our benchmark results, we now assess their robustness along the follow-
ing dimensions. First, we present the estimation results using the alternative instrumental
variable approach discussed earlier. Second, we re-estimate the model with an alternative
de￿nition of labor supply: the total hours worked by both husband and wife. Third, we
discuss the choice of instrumental variable and the measurement issues associated with our
￿nancial variables. Finally, we use limited consumption information provided in the PSID
to explore the welfare implications of personal bankruptcy ￿ling.
4.1 Evidence from the Instrumental Variable Approach
As discussed in Section 3.1, the IV approach has been widely used in the literature on
program evaluation. Although the IV approach requires stronger assumptions about the
error terms than does our benchmark or the contemporaneous selection approach, the results
are easier to interpret. In the second regression, the coe¢ cient on the propensity to ￿le, or
^ ￿, gives us the e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply, which is independent of the
household￿ s characteristics and the bankruptcy ￿ling status.17
The ￿rst-stage regression in the IV approach is the same as in the benchmark; therefore,
we report only the second-stage regression results (Table 7). As shown, the estimated e⁄ect
of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply, calculated according to (15), is ￿0:17, suggesting
that upon ￿ling for bankruptcy, heads of bankrupt households would reduce their work hours
about 15 percent, or 330 hours a year, compared to the hours they would work if they did
17That is, the treatment e⁄ect on the treated is the same as the treatment e⁄ect on the randomly assigned
subject. See Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999).
16not ￿le. Again, as in the benchmark case, the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant at the
usual 90 or 95 percent con￿dence levels. The e⁄ects of other control variables remain largely
unchanged.
4.2 Evidence on Annual Hours Worked by the Family
In this subsection, we use a broader de￿nition of labor supply￿ total hours worked by husband
and wife, or ￿family hours￿ ￿ in our analysis. For single or divorced households, their family
hours would be the same as the head hours. Among married households, 75 percent of the
wives work; among married households that ￿led for bankruptcy, roughly 80 percent of the
wives work.
To control for the characteristics of a spouse, we include in the explanatory variables the
wife￿ s age interacted with martial status, the wife￿ s education level interacted with marital
status, and the wife￿ s wage (if she works) interacted with marital status. The estimation
results of the contemporaneous selection approach are shown in Table 8. Now the estimated
e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the family labor supply for bankrupt households, calculated
according to (15), is ￿0:36. This suggests that upon ￿ling for bankruptcy, the average
bankrupt household would reduce its family labor supply about 30 percent, or close to 860
hours a year, compared to the hours they would work if they did not ￿le. Again, the
coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant at the usual con￿dence levels. This is not surprising
given that married households most likely make decisions as a unit. Anecdotally, the majority
of bankruptcy ￿lings for married couples are joint ￿lings, though this information is not
available in the PSID. The e⁄ects of other variables on households￿labor supply remain
roughly unchanged from the results obtained earlier when we considered only the labor
hours of household heads.
4.3 Additional Experiments
Now we brie￿ y discuss two other issues on the robustness of our results: the selection of
the instrumental variable and the potential measurement error associated with the ￿nancial
variables.
Some may argue that the absolute number of households ￿ling for bankruptcy is a better
proxy for the peer e⁄ect than the rate of bankruptcy ￿ling. After all, it is often the number
of bankruptcy cases, not the rate, that catches the media and average households￿atten-
tion. To test this theory, we experiment using this alternative proxy as our instrumental
variable for a bankruptcy decision. Indeed, as a factor in the bankruptcy ￿ling decision,
the absolute number of bankruptcy ￿lings turns out to be statistically and economically
17signi￿cant. But the e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply remains negative and
statistically insigni￿cant in the new speci￿cation.
In calculating our ￿nancial variables, we used the annually measured data on home
equity but took the nonhome wealth and unsecured debt from the most recent wealth survey.
This approach obviously introduces measurement errors. To assess the importance of this
potential mismeasurement, we re-estimate our model using only observations from 1984-1985,
1989-1990, and 1994-1995. Because the PSID has detailed wealth information for 1984, 1989,
and 1994, we expect the ￿nancial variables to be most accurately measured in those years
and in the years immediately after them.18 The new sample contains 22740 observations on
6110 households with 109 bankruptcy ￿lings. Again, the e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling on the
labor supply of household heads remains negative and statistically insigni￿cant.
4.4 Welfare Implications: Consumption Insurance
Our results so far suggest that households do not increase their labor supply under personal
bankruptcy. Nonetheless, bankruptcy discharge may play other roles that improve social
welfare. Among others, debt discharge may provide debtors with consumption insurance
against adverse shocks. To address this issue, we ask whether bankrupt households consume
more than what they would if they did not ￿le for bankruptcy. In theory, the positive
wealth shock induced by debt discharge suggests that bankrupt households would consume
more upon ￿ling for bankruptcy. On the other hand, the negative ￿nancial consequences
of an e⁄ective tax on future earnings (under Chapter 13) seems to argue for the opposite
conclusion. Moreover, the di¢ culty of gaining access to the credit market after ￿ling for
bankruptcy would lead households to cut their consumption, though it is not clear whether
the cut would be greater than it would be if they had to repay their debts.
The PSID provides information on food consumption. We use the same methodology
as in the benchmark (Section 3.3) to estimate the e⁄ect of ￿ling for bankruptcy on food
consumption. To do so, we replace log annual work hours with log in￿ ation-adjusted food
consumption. Data on food consumption are not available for 1988 and 1989. We also delete
observations with zero food consumption. The ￿nal sample consists of 33438 observations
on 5748 households with 146 bankruptcy ￿lings. We ￿nd that the bankrupt households con-
sumed more than what they would have consumed if they had not ￿led for bankruptcy, but
the estimated coe¢ cient is statistically insigni￿cant (table is not shown). Our consumption
estimation, therefore, implies that there may be a role for bankruptcy provisions as a social
18Using only years with wealth surveys (that is, 1984, 1989, and 1994) yields only 50 bankruptcy cases,
which will signi￿cantly increase the imprecision of our estimation.
18insurance program that helps households maintain a certain desired consumption level when
adverse shocks occur.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
The primary goal of the debt discharge in the U.S. personal bankruptcy law is to preserve
human capital by maintaining incentives to work. In this paper, we provided the ￿rst
quantitative analysis of the e⁄ect of ￿ling for personal bankruptcy on the labor supply. In
our empirical estimations, we control for both the endogenous decision for ￿le for bankruptcy
and heterogeneity across households. We ￿nd that for households that ￿led for bankruptcy,
neither the head of household alone nor the head and the wife jointly worked more hours
than they would have worked if they had not ￿led for bankruptcy. To the contrary, all
of the estimated e⁄ects of personal bankruptcy on the labor supply are negative, though
not statistically signi￿cant at the usual con￿dence levels. Our ￿ndings, therefore, do not
support the long-held belief in the ￿fresh start￿e⁄ect of personal bankruptcy. Consequently,
bankruptcy provisions for debt discharge cannot be justi￿ed on the grounds of labor e¢ ciency
concerns.
Although bankruptcy discharge does not appear to achieve the desired e⁄ect on work
incentives, our analysis does not rule out other roles of the bankruptcy provisions. For
example, debt discharge can provide debtors with consumption insurance against adverse
shocks. Using the PSID data on food consumption, we ￿nd that the bankrupt households
indeed consumed more under personal bankruptcy than what they would have consumed if
they had not ￿led for bankruptcy. The estimate, however, is not statistically signi￿cant.
For future research, one question of great policy importance is: how do the two bank-
ruptcy chapters (i.e., Chapter 7 and Chapter 13) di⁄er in their e⁄ects on the labor supply
of bankrupt households? Because of the relatively small number of bankruptcy ￿lings in the
current PSID data, if we allow the labor supply to vary with di⁄erent chapters, we would in-
troduce large imprecisions in our estimations. We, therefore, shall revisit the question when
additional data become available. We also left out other important and related issues. One
such issue is the e⁄ect of bankruptcy provisions on small business formation. There are two
interesting questions here. The ￿rst one is whether bankrupt entrepreneurs are more likely
to start new business again after ￿ling for personal bankruptcy than they would be if they
had to repay all their debts. This question is parallel to the labor supply issue studied in this
paper. The second question is whether generous bankruptcy provisions encourage business
formation in general. We could not use the PSID data to answer the ￿rst question because
only 17 entrepreneurs ￿led for bankruptcy in our sample. For the second question, while
19further studies are still needed, White (2001) does ￿nd that generous bankruptcy provisions
encourage business formation. Elul and Gottardi (2003) also provide a theoretical analysis
of business formation and personal bankruptcy.
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23Table 1: Homestead and nonhomestead exemptions by state, 1983 and 1992, in dollars
1983 1992
State Homestead Nonhomestead Homestead Nonhomestead
Alabama 5,000￿ 3,000￿ 5,000￿ 3,000￿
Alaska 27,000￿ 1,500￿ 54,000 3,000￿
Arizona 50,000 7,600 100,000 1,650￿
Arkansas No limit 950 No limit 1,700￿
California 45,000 2,500 75,000 1,600
Colorado 20,000 5,000 30,000￿ 1,000￿
Connecticut 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
D.C. 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
Delaware 5,000 75 0 500￿
Florida No limit 1,000￿ No limit 1,000￿
Georgia 5,000 4,500 5,000￿ 1,500￿
Hawaii 20,000 1,000 20,000￿ 1,000￿
Idaho 1,200￿ 4,000￿ 50,000￿ 1,500￿
Illinois 7,500￿ 2,750￿ 7,500￿ 3,200￿
Indiana 7,500 4,100 7,500￿ 4,100￿
Iowa 500 4,000 No limit 5,100￿
Kansas No limit 500 No limit 20,000￿
Kentucky 5,000 6,000 5,000￿ 3,500￿
Louisiana 15,000 No limit 15,000 No limit
Maine 7,500￿ 2,300￿ 7,500￿ 6,100￿
Maryland 2,500 3,500 0 5,500￿
Massachusetts 60,000 3,500 100,000 1,675￿
Michigan 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
Minnesota No limit 9,500 No limit 3,000￿
Mississippi 30,000 8,000 75,000￿ 10,000￿
Missouri 8,000 3,500 8,000 1,750￿
Montana 40,000 200 40,000￿ 1,200
Nebraska 6,500 5,500 10,000￿ 2,500￿
Nevada 90,000 9,000 80,000￿ 6,200￿
New Hampshire 5,000 5,500 30,000￿ 1,000￿
continued on next page
24continued from previous page
1983 1992
State Homestead Nonhomestead Homestead Nonhomestead
New Jersey 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
New Mexico 20,000￿ 6,500￿ 20,000￿ 4,500￿
New York 10,000￿ 5,600￿ 10,000￿ 4,900￿
North Carolina 7,500 8,500 10,000￿ 5,000￿
North Dakota 80,000 10,000 80,000￿ 6,200￿
Ohio 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 5,000￿ 1,800￿
Oklahoma No limit 5,000 No limit 3,000￿
Oregon 15,000 2,650 15,000 8,700
Pennsylvania 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
Rhode Island 7,500￿ 4,000￿ 7,500￿ 5,350￿
South Carolina 5,000 3,750 7,500￿ 5,350￿
South Dakota No limit 2,400 No limit￿ 4,000
Tennessee 5,000 4,750 5,000 4,000￿
Texas No limit 30,000 No limit 30,000￿
Utah 8,000 3,000 8,000 1,500￿
Vermont 30,000 No limit 30,000￿ 10,600￿
Virginia 3,500￿ 5,000￿ 5,000￿ 2,000
Washington 30,000 6,750 30,000￿ 2,600￿
West Virginia 5,000 1,000 7,500￿ 1,600￿
Wisconsin 25,000 900 40,000 2,200￿
Wyoming 10,000￿ 3,000￿ 10,000￿ 2,000￿
Notes: (a) The above values of exemption limits are for single ￿lers. (b) ￿ indicates that the
exemption is doubled for married couples who ￿le for bankruptcy together. (c) We use the
federal exemption if the state permits ￿lers to choose the federal exemption and the federal
limit exceeds the state limit.
Source: Gropp, Scholz and White (1997), and White (1998).
25Table 2: Homestead and nonhomestead exemptions by state, 1993 - 1996, in dollars
Year State Homestead Nonhomestead
1993 Connecticut 75,000￿ unchanged




1994 D.C. 15,000￿ 10,700￿
Michigan 15,000￿ 10,700￿
New Jersey 15,000￿ 10,700￿
Pennsylvania 15,000￿ 10,700￿
South Carolina 15,000￿ 10,700￿
1995 Maine 12,500￿ 2,900￿
Vermont 75,000￿ unchanged
1996 Minnesota 200,000 unchanged
California unchanged 2,500￿
Notes: (a) We report only states that have changed exemptions, either homestead or non-
homestead, between 1993 and 1996. (b) The above values of exemption limits are for single
￿lers. (c) * indicates that the exemption is doubled for married couples who ￿le for bank-
ruptcy together. (d) We use the federal exemption if the state permits ￿lers to choose the
federal exemption and the federal limit exceeds the state limit.
Source: Lin and White (2001).
26Table 3: State garnishment laws
State Wage garnishment (%) State Wage garnishment (%)
Alabama FED Montana 10
Alaska FED Nebraska 15
Arizona FED Nevada FED
Arkansas FED New Hampshire 0
California FED New Jersey 10
Colorado FED New Mexico FED
Connecticut FED New York 10
D.C. FED North Carolina 0
Delaware 15 North Dakota FED
Florida FED Ohio FED
Georgia FED Oklahoma FED
Hawaii 19 Oregon FED
Idaho FED Pennsylvania 0
Illinois 15 Rhode Island FED
Indiana FED South Carolina 0
Iowa FED South Dakota 20
Kansas FED Tennessee FED
Kentucky FED Texas 0
Louisiana FED Utah FED
Maine FED Vermont 0
Maryland FED Virginia FED
Massachusetts FED Washington FED
Michigan FED West Virgina 20
Minnesota FED Wisconsin 20
Mississippi FED Wyoming FED
Missouri FED
Notes: ￿FED￿ indicates that the federal maximum of 25 percent garnishment allowable
binds.
Source: Dawsey and Ausubel (2002).
27Table 4: Descriptive statistics of major variables, entire sample versus bankruptcy sample
Entire sample Bankruptcy sample
Variable Mean S.d. Median Mean S.d. Median
Age 39 10 37 35 9 34
Head male￿ 81 39 73 45
Head white￿ 67 47 62 49
Education (￿high school)￿ 83 38 83 38
Own house￿ 63 48 47 50
Own business￿ 12 33 8 27
Married￿ 67 47 59 49
Number of children 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.0
Experienced unemployment 1.1 10 3.3 18
in previous year￿
Experienced bad health 0.9 10 1.4 12
in previous year￿
Divorced in previous year￿ 1.4 12 4.2 20
Head￿ s hours worked 2142 665 2080 2122 607 2060
Head￿ s wage 11.2 13.5 9.2 8.0 9.9 6.7
Wife￿ s age 25 19 30 19 16 24
Wife￿ s education 43 50 36 48
(￿ high school)￿
Wife￿ s wage 8.65 11.77 6.86 5.04 3.39 4.30
Nonexempt assets ($) 71529 397176 1181 7859 24053 0
Unsecured debt ($) 2905 16635 440 5087 9575 1730
Family hours worked 3037 1237 2934 2871 1199 2483
Family income ($) 36000 34714 29748 23676 14777 21573
Note: (a) The values of all ￿nancial variables are in real dollars, de￿ ated by total CPI, 1982-
84=100. (b) S.d.: Standard deviation. (c) * indicates dummy variables. Means of dummy
variables are expressed in percent, and their medians are not reported.
Source: The PSID, 1984-1996, total number of observations for the whole sample is 48834;
the number of observations for the bankruptcy sample is 213.
28Table 5: Probit estimation of determinants of bankruptcy ￿ling
Variable Coe⁄. S.d. Marginal e⁄ect
Age of household head 4.67e-03 0.02 1.44e-05
Age2 -1.34e-04 2.79e-04 -3.90e-07
Education (high school or above) 0.05 0.08 1.35e-04
Race (white = 1) 0.03 0.07 8.11e-05
Gender (male = 1) -0.10 0.10 -3.27e-04
Marital status (married = 1) 0.02￿ 0.10 5.56e-05
Number of children 0.04￿￿ 0.02 1.23e-04
Own home -0.01 0.07 -2.31e-05
Self-employed -0.10 0.11 -2.85e-04
Family income (previous year, $1;000s) -4.78e-03 6.31e-03 -1.07e-05
Family income squared -1.58e-05 6.93e-05 -5.33e-08
Head￿ s wage (previous year) -0.02￿￿ 0.01 -5.62e-05
Unsecured debt ( $1;000s) 0.05￿ 7.45e-03 1.39e-04
Unsecured debt squared -6.29e-04￿ 1.72e-04 -1.77e-06
Nonexempt asset ($1;000s) -3.69e-03￿ 1.62e-04 -1.03e-05
Nonexempt asset squared 3.47e-07￿ 1.69e-07 9.72e-10
Unsecured debt * nonexempt assets -8.66e-07 1.11e-04 -6.18e-09
Divorced in previous year 0.39￿￿ 0.21 2.03e-03
Experienced unemployment in previous year 0.31￿￿ 0.17 6.76e-04
Experienced bad health in previous year 0.17 0.22 6.56e-04
Maximum state wage garnishment rate (%) 0.03 0.37 7.49e-05
Lagged state unemployed rate 0.02 0.03 5.43e-05
Lagged state income growth rate 1.66e-03 0.02 4.28e-06
Lagged state bankruptcy ￿ling rate 0.66￿ 0.33 1.84e-03
Note: (a) The values of all ￿nancial variables are in real dollars, de￿ ated by total CPI, 1982-
84=100. (b) Coe¢ cients on time and region dummies are not reported. (c) The marginal
e⁄ects for discrete variables are for discrete change of their values from 0 to 1. (d) Standard
deviations (S.d.) are corrected for dependence across observations of the same household.
(e) ￿ and ￿￿ indicate statistically signi￿cant at the 95 percent and the 90 percent con￿dence
levels, respectively.
29Table 6: The e⁄ects of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply of the head of household:
Results using the contemporaneous selection control approach
Variable Coe¢ cient Standard error
Age of household head 0.02￿ 4.89e-3
Age2 -3.18e-04￿ 6.07e-05
Education (high school or above) 0.08￿ 0.02
Race (white = 1) 0.10￿ 0.01
Gender (male = 1) 0.14￿ 0.02
Marital status (married = 1) -1.06e-03 0.02
Number of children -6.86e-03 5.29e-3
Own home 0.05￿ 0.02
Self-employed -0.10￿ 0.02
Family income in previous year ($1;000s) 5.85e-03￿ 1.99e-03
Family income squared -1.11e-05 1.41e-05
Wage rate in previous year -5.43e-03￿ 1.58e-03
Divorced in previous year 7.37e-03 0.05
Experienced unemployment in previous year -1.29￿ 0.15
Experienced bad health in previous year -0.94￿ 0.13
Maximum state wage garnishment rate (%) -0.07 0.06
Lagged state unemployment rate -1.51e-02￿ 4.09e-03
Lagged state income growth -2.80e-03 3.22e-03
Bankruptcy dummy (1 if bankrupt and 0 if not) 0.57 0.39
Inverse Mills￿ratio for the repaid 0.05 0.90
Inverse Mills￿ratio for the bankrupt -0.16 0.14
Memo item:
E⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling -0.01 2.45
Notes: (a) The values of ￿nancial variables are in real dollars, de￿ ated by total CPI, 1982-
84=100. (b) Coe¢ cients on time and region dummies are not reported. (c) Standard errors
are corrected for dependence across observations of the same household and are obtained
through bootstrapping. (d) ￿ and ￿￿ indicate statistically signi￿cant at the 95 percent and
the 90 percent con￿dence levels, respectively. (e) The e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling is calculated
for an average bankruptcy ￿ler according to equation (15).
30Table 7: The e⁄ects of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply of the head of household:
Results using the instrumental variable approach
Variable Coe¢ cient Standard error
Age of household head 0.02￿ 4.44e-3
Age2 -3.36e-04￿ 5.44e-05
Education (high school or above) 0.09￿ 0.02
Race (white = 1) 0.10￿ 0.01
Gender (male = 1) 0.15￿ 0.02
Marital status (married = 1) 1.87e-02 0.02
Number of children -9.55e-03￿ 4.85e-3
Own home 0.06￿ 0.01
Self-employed -0.09￿ 0.02
Family income in previous year ($1;000s) 3.50e-03￿ 4.09e-04
Family income squared -3.38e-06￿ 7.16e-07
Wage rate in previous year -2.20e-03 1.20e-03
Divorced in previous year 1.77e-03 0.04
Experienced unemployment in previous year -1.30￿ 0.13
Experienced bad health in previous year -0.94￿ 0.13
Maximum state wage garnishment rate -0.07 0.06
Lagged state unemployment rate -1.61e-02￿ 3.95e-03
Lagged state income growth -2.81e-03 3.29e-03
Probability of ￿ling for bankruptcy -0.17 1.42
Notes: (a) The values of ￿nancial variables are in real dollars, de￿ ated by total CPI, 1982-
84=100. (b) Coe¢ cients on time and region dummies are not reported. (c) Standard errors
are corrected for dependence across observations of the same household and are obtained
through bootstrapping. (d) ￿ and ￿￿ indicate statistically signi￿cant at the 95 percent and
the 90 percent con￿dence levels, respectively.
31Table 8: The e⁄ects of bankruptcy ￿ling on the labor supply of the head and the wife of
household: Results using the contemporaneous selection control approach
Variable Coe¢ cient Standard error
Age of household head 0.03￿ 4.69e-3
Age2 -4.64e-04￿ 6.06e-05
Education (high school or above) 0.06￿ 0.02
Race (white = 1) 0.05￿ 0.01
Gender (male = 1) 0.26￿ 0.02
Marital status (married = 1) 0.34￿ 0.04
Number of children -0.04￿ 5.71e-3
Own home 0.05￿ 0.01
Self-employed -0.11￿ 0.03
Family income in previous year ($1000s) 8.90e-03￿ 2.79e-03
Family income squared -1.94e-05 1.96e-05
Wage rate in previous year (head) -0.01￿ 2.54e-03
Divorced in previous year -0.03 0.05
Experienced unemployment in previous year -1.08￿ 0.11
Experienced bad health in previous year -0.73￿ 0.13
Wife￿ s age -1.12e-03 1.09e-03
Wife￿ s education (high school or above) 0.02 0.02
Wife￿ s wage in previous year 4.08e-03￿ 8.80e-04
Maximum state wage garnishment rate 7.01e-03 0.06
Lagged state unemployment rate -1.72e-02￿ 4.27e-03
Lagged state income growth -3.16e-03 2.95e-03
Bankruptcy dummy (1 if bankrupt and 0 if not) -0.08 0.35
Inverse Mills￿ratio for the repaid 0.17 1.06
Inverse Mills￿ratio for the bankrupt 0.07 0.12
Memo item:
E⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling -0.36 2.86
Notes: (a) The values of ￿nancial variables are in real dollars, de￿ ated by total CPI, 1982-
84=100. (b) Coe¢ cients on time and region dummies are not reported. (c) Standard errors
are corrected for dependence across observations of the same household and are obtained
through bootstrapping. (d) ￿ indicates statistically signi￿cant at the 95 percent con￿dence
level. (e) The e⁄ect of bankruptcy ￿ling is calculated for an average bankruptcy ￿ler accord-
ing to equation (15).
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